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IN THE

Supreme Court
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD C. ANDERSEN,
Plaintiff OJYI)d Appe:lZoot,
Case No.

vs.

7356

BINGHAM AND GARFIELD RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF :OF RESPONDENT

I.
STA'TEMEN'T :OF FACTS

To the end that the facts of this case as presented
to the jury may be fully and fairly stated to the court,
respondent sup,p1ements the statement contained in Appellant's Brief as follows:

1. At the time of the accident it was dark, with the
sky clear and the highway smooth, level and concrete
1
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surfaced. (R. 130) The silhouette failure (p. 3) has no
factual basis here. The darkness was described as
''pitch''. (R. 258) Appellant's view of the crossing and
approaching train was unobstructed. (Ex. 3 and 4)
2. Appellant incorrectly cites the record (p: 3) as
establishing that plaintiff's failure to observe the train
as he approached the crossing was an illusion from an
engine headlight. This statement is as factually speculative as the equally possible theories that appellant was
in a condition una:ble to observe or act prudently under
the circumstances, was driving too fast, was not looking, etc.
3. Plaintiff specifically abandoned (R. 343.(a)) all
of his negligence allegations with the exception of the
alleged defective brakes; yet in his brief (p. 3) he reiterated that there were no lights or automatic safety
devices at the crossing; that no flagman was there stationed; and that there were no lights on the lead car of
the train. The crossing protection was in every respect
standard, and the court without objection so instructed.
(R. 86)
4. Plaintiff incorrectly cites the record as establishing his speed at 31 to 40 miles per hour. (p. 3).
The cited pages, plus ~pages 172 and 182 of the record,
indicate plaintiff's speed varied from a minimum sufficient to pass another car which itself was going 31 miles
per hour (R. 172) up to 45 miles per hour. (R. 182)
5. On page 4 of his brief plaintiff cites page 226
of the record for the fact that "At the time Paddock
gave the washout signal the leading end of the leading
2
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car 'Yas about three car lengths fron1 the railroad crossing". But Engineer Colby guessed this distance at one
car length. (R. 279) Trainman Chipman said there was
not time to stop the· train. (R·. 232) Colby said likewise
(R. 293-4); and Trainman Hyland (R. 309) and Paddock, 'vho was in charge of the train crew (R. 317, 320)
said the washout was given 10 to 15 feet from the highway pavement-approximately 36 feet or one standard
car length from the point of impact.
6. On page 7 of appellant's brief the fact is stated
that "the leakage in this train vvas unusual". Omitted
is Engineer Colby's statement that the leakage-,normally present in railroad airbrake operations-was ''the
type of leakage we have been contending with and working with on that particular job ever. since I have been
running engines out there". (R. 291)
7. On page 8 and the first full paragraph of page
9 of his brief appear improperly in the statement of
facts unfounded argument that will be met hereafter.
But it should be noted that the medical prognosis was
that plaintiff's recovery eventually would he, or in any
event might be complete. (R. 198, 200-201, 203-5, 209·213, 216-2'17, 220-221); not that Andersen has actually
suffered "permanent injury".
8.

Omitted material facts are the following:

(a) When plain tiff's peril was ascertained, the
train could not have been stopped in time to avoid
the collision. This is uncontroverted, coming from
Colby (R. 294), Paddock (R. 319), Hyland (R. 304)
and Chipman (R. 232). While Colby on the basis of his
3
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own estimates at first felt that there might have been a
possibility for plaintiff to complete his end run around
the train ( R. 294), this guess was later qualified when
he stated that the distances given by the men at the
front end of the train should he governing rather than
his own guesses. (R. 280)
(b) The defendant railroad took the following action to warn plaintiff: standard reflectorized railroad
cross buck and advance warnjng signs were within Andersen's vision, _one 21 feet west of the crossing and the
other 417 feet to the west (R. 28 and Ex. 3 and 4); three
trainmen were on the lead car equipped with and using
standard lanterns to warn oncoming traffic. (R. 304)
The engine bell was ringing and the usual crossing
whistle signal was given by the engineer. (R. 273) A&
shown by Exhibits 3 and 4 the view was unobstructed
and there were no unusual crossing conditions.
(c) The actual halt of the train was entirely normal according to most of the witnesses. (R. 320) Things
happened "on split second schedule'' (R. 232); except
for the physical distances on Exhibits 3 and 4, estimates of other distances were only rough approximations. (R. 257)
(d) Plaintiff applied his own motor vehicle brakes
to the extent that tire marks 28 inches long were left on
the pavement 72 feet west of the point of impact (R. 189) ;
then he· apparently released the brakes and decided to
end-run the train. (R. 317)
(e) Defendant's engine was modern and in "excellent" condition (R. 271); all 15 of the cars were
4
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equipped with standard airbrakes, 5 of the 6 loaded cars
and 3 of the 9 empties 'vith the n1ore recent AB ty.pe
of brake, and one loaded and 6 empties with the standard
K-2 type. (Ex. 11 and R. 331) No defect in these brakes
\Yas ever located (R. 332, 12·4); after the accident the
train ":ras operated as before except for the damaged
lead car. (R. 333)
(f) These cars were likewise equipped with hand
brakes 'vhich were never used as the train was under
control and the engineer felt no need for hand brakes.
(R. 277)

II.

1. The jury was fairly and properly instructed (if
the case 'vas to go to the jury) and plaintiff's motion for
a new trial was correctly denied.

2. The Court erred in denying defendant's motion
for a directed verdict.

III.

ARGUMENT
Point 1.
1. The jury was fairly and prop~erly instructed (if ~the
case was to go to the jury) and plaintiff's motion for a
new trial was cor~rectly deni1ed.
5
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Defendant's first point is the reverse of plaintiff's
sing-le point under which he has consolidated his four
assignments of error. We submit that the jury was
properly and fairly charged if indeed the case was to
go to the jury.
(a) At the outset we must meet a sub-argument
of plaintiff-that the defendant had violated the Federal
Safety Appliance Act.
On page 11 of plaintiff's brief is quoted the pertinent language of the Act; the text of the absolute duty
(not absolute liabilit.y as plaintiff argues on page 15)
is that the engineer must be able to control the speed
of the train ''without requiring brakemen to use the
common handhrake for that purpose.'' It is therefore
an absolute duty, but qwa~ifie:d by the above w·ords, that
Congress has substituted for the common law duty of
reasonable care. Thus qualified, we have no quarrel with
plaintiff's statements and citations under this sub-point,
:pages 11 to 17. Conceding, too, that as argued on page
17, "the test. of compliance lies in the performance of
the appliance" and assuming that if Colby's testimony
is to be believed, the brakes on all 15 cars of the train
did not go into emergency, how does this establish a
violation of the Act~
Colby said that even though the leakage was great,
he had control of his train and never felt the need for
hand brakes. (R. 277) Obviously this was so, for no
one has ever contended that any equipment was defective or failed to function on the engin·e; and the 5 of 6
loaded cars and 3 of the 9 empties which had the AB
6
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type of brake would function insofar as emergency was
concerned, regardless of leakage or prior brake service
applications. (R.. 260, 336-340.)
The only possible failure short of ideal operation
"'"ould be in the 5 empty sand gondola cars, the one empty
flat car, and the loaded tank car next to the engine which
had the less-efficient-as-to-en1ergency, but still st~andard.,
K-2 typ~e of brake. (Ex. 11, R. 258-260, 335.)
As Colby said, there are thousands of these K-2
type brakes in operation as standard equipment on the
various railroad trunk lines (R. 258); yet up·on analysis
his oomplaint and that of plaintiff is that this standard
equipment-lacking the emergency reservoir feature of
the more modern AB typ~operated just ias it was d:eS.igned to do. According to Colby some probably didn't
go into emergency when Colby "big-holed" on top of
the many service, lap, and leakage applications of braking power. (R. 252') :
Q.

Now, what

hap~pened

when you big-holed the

brakes~

A.

Well, the train began slowing down.

Q.

Did you get an emergency

A.

Not throughout the train, no.

Q.

You didn't go into ·emergency throughout the
train?

A.

The train didn't.

application~

Even so, the statutory test of the Federal Safety
Appliance Act-''that the engine·er on the locomotive
drawing such train can control its speed without requir7
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ing brakemen to use the common hand brake for that
purp~se," was met. (R. 276) :
Q.

The brakes apparently operated properly, on
each of those applications you obtained the
necessary braking power, right~

A.

Yes, I got too much when I held it on lap,
then I got too much braking power and had
to release it.

Q. You didn't notice anything that led you to
feel you should stop that train because you
were not having proper braking, did you~
A.

Not in that short distance.

Q.

Not in that short distance.

Q.

So you kept proceeding; is that right?

·A. Y·es, sir, I .kept proceeding.

Q. And your brakes controlled that train so that
your speed gradually decreased; is that correct~

A.

Well, it would decrease, then I would gain.

Q.

Then you would speed up a

A.

Then I would speed up a little.

Q. Then brake
A.

little~

again~

Then start to pick up.

Q. 'Then brake again?
A.

Then start to pick up.

Q.

At no time did you feel it necessary to signal
for hand brakes, did you~

A. No, hecauseQ.

At any time8
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1\1R. BLACK: Let him answer the question.
l\IR. BEHLE: He said "'No''.

THE COURT: Well, he said "because"
something: I think perha.ps he should be per.mitted to explain his answer, if it is responsive
to your question .
.L~.

At the lower end of this run, or grade, the
grade is not as steep; therefore, I knew I
could stop the train down there.

Q.

That's right; it says from 2 per cent down to
1.85, and gradually flattens off, in the forepart of Exhibit 2, is that right~

A.

Yes.

Q.

But, in spite of the fact that you knew the
grade was getting less, did you feel any
need for asking for hand brakes~

A.

No.

Defendant accordingly submits that there was no
evidence of violation of the Federal~ Safety Appliance
Act-the only one of the complaint's ten original allegations of negligence ever a serious factor in this case.
(b) Plaintiff's next sub-point-pages 17 to 2'4-is
that the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was here fairly
applicable.
If the case was to go to the jury at all, defendant
so concedes. This despite argument on fallacious pTemises set forth on page 18 of appellant's brief which will
be covered later, including attention to the very heart
of plaintiff's case delineated on page 19-' ~a split second
would have saved plaintiff harmless.''
9
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(c) Thus we come, plaintiff's brief .page 24, to the
single point of plaintiff's appeal-that the jury was improperly instructed.
We have no quarrel with the cited authorities (pp.
25 to 31) as those cases and authorities are applied to
their own facts. Interesting, however; is the omission
from those authorities of the Dr~mmond and Van Wagoner cases, the two recent leading cases of this court
involving railroad crossing ac~idents.
Diametrically opposed to plaintiff's contention that
instructing on both the law of contributory negligence
and the Last Clear Chance Doctrine is error, we would
have thought the contrary elementary in negligence
cases. The jury in its deliberations in a last clear chance
must, as we see it, as a rule make three determinations
and be instructed · accordingly; (1) Was the defendant
negligent at all~ If not, there is no liability; if so, the
next question arises; (2) Was .plaintiff negligent~ If
not, there is liability on the part of defendant; if so,
there is presented the final .question; ( 3) Did defendant have and fail to use the last clear chance~ If this
is answered in the negative, plaintiff cannot prevail; if
so, defendant is liable.
Thus we conceive it a non sequitur to say that
"where the doctrine of last clear chance is presented as
an iss.ue for the jury it' is clearly erroneous for the
court to instruct that if the negligence of plaintiff contributed to cause his own injury he cannot recover.''
The instructions must cover hoth simple negligence and
contributory negligence as essential preliminaries to the
10
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final application of the doctrine of the last clea.r chance.
And so the trial court instructed in a charge of
t"~enty-tw·o instructions (R. 74 to 95 ), including that of
No. 21 wherein the jury was directed to consider the
entire charge as a connected whole without undue reference to any one particular point. (R.. 194) True, in
Instruction No. 11 covering contributory negligence and
plaintiff's duties as a driver, no specific mention is made
of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine, which is covered by
the very next instruction. But this court has often stated
the impracticability of covering and reiterating all points
and possibilities in each sep·arate instruction.
Van Cleave v. Lynch,
106 Utah 159, 166 P. 2d 244.
Earle v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Corp·.,
109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877.
Gogo v. Continental Casualty Co.,
109 Utah 122, 165 P. 2d 882.
Graham v. Johnson,
______ Utah ----.--, 166 P. 2d 230.
Martin v. Sheffield,
______ Utah ______ , 189 P. 2d 127.
And so we submit that the charge was p-roper and
fairly presented the case to the jury, which without too
much difficulty (R. 39) found the issues in favor of
defendant and the evidence to establish either want of
negligence on the part of defendant, that plaintiff's own
delict was a proximate cause of his injuries, or probably
both.
11
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Point 2.
2. The Court erred in denying de{iendant's motion for
a directed verdict.

Defendant, to sustain in any event the judgment
belovv, submits that under the evidence in this case the
court should have directed a verdict against plaintiff;
the case should not have been submitted to the jury at
all for decision on the merits. Under the evidence most
favorable to plaintiff, and as a matter of law, his own
actions and failures to act were a .proximate cause of
the accident; defendant was neither itself negligent; nor
did it have the last clear chance to avoid the collision.
(a) Defendant's lack of negligence has heen argued under Point 1(a) and need not be reiterated here.
Plaintiff's own negligence, though speculative in
detail, neViertheless existed and p:ersisted until the ~end.
(b)

Having the duty as he approached the crossing to
use ordinary care for his own safety, to use his senses
of sight and hearing, to keep a lookout ahead, to keep
his car under safe control, and to drive at a speed which
was reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions of darkness (including any illusive mountain
shadows), Lloyd Andersen nevertheless heeded not the
reflectorized warning signs 417 feet and 21 feet in advance of the crossing, heeded not the trainmen's warning lights and sounding bells and whistles. He plunged
right on at a speed over 31 and prohably at least 45
miles per hour in an attempt to ''end-run'' the defendant's train, despite its right of way.

12
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This delict on plaintiff's part continued right up
to the point of impact, 'vhatever its motivation-excessive speed, improper lookout, or reckless driving when
72 feet a"Tay . A. ndersen finally determined to beat the
train. His conduct 'Yas black in contrast to the white
of Davies'· donkey tied in the road, Teakle thrown bet"Teen the rails, Bunker fallen from the pilot, and the
dumb child in the Thompson case.
Utah's most recent case on this point is Drun1mond
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 177 P.(2d) 903, ________ Utah ________ ,
decided February 20, 1947. In view of this recent unanimous decision by the present Utah Supreme Court and
its review of Utah law where railroad crossing accidents are concerned, we largely confine our authorities
on this point to that case.
There, as here, plaintiff driver was familiar with
the road; the crossing angle was approximately the
same, although there the train approached- from the
driver's rear. The view was unobstructed in both cases,
although for a much further distance in this case; there
were no unusual crossing conditions such as protruding
rails, multiplicity of tracks, etc., in either case. But here
the facts are much stronger for the defendant: the
train was moving at a much slower rate of speed; plaintiff was driving much faster ; and there was no evidence
as in the Drummond case that there were inadequate
crossing signals or warnings.

A fortiori it seems plain that in this case, too, the
trial court should have said as in the Drummond case:
13
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'' So, here, the facts peculiar to this case
lead to the inescapable conclusion that plaintiff's
own acts and conduct were not in keeping with
the care required of a traveler upon the highway about to go upon and across the tracks of a
railroad. Had this plaintiff exercised such care,
then the collision would have been avoided.''
For further Utah cases, where on facts more favorable to plaintiff than in this case recovery was denied
plain tiff drivers o;s a matt~er of ZaJW, se·e :
Nabrotzky v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad,
103 Utah 274, 135 P.(2d) 115;
Nuttall v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad,
98 Utah 383, 99 P.(2d) 15;
Pollett v. Denver & Rio Grande,
82 Utah 505, 2·5 P.(2d) 963;
Clark v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
70 Utah 29, 257 P. 1050;
Shortino v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Co.,
52 Utah 276, 174 P. 860.
Applying the same rule, the United States Supreme
Court said in Fairport, P. & E. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. 8.
589, 78 L. ed. 1446, 1448, imlvolving this s1ame Federal
81(]4 ety A ~p1lvarnoe Act :
There is also evidence which fairly estab- _
lishes that as respondent drew near the crossing
the train was in plain view for a sufficient length
of time to have enabled respondent, by the use of
ordinary care, to see the train, stop and avoid
the collision, and, therefore, that she was guilty
of contributory negligence. Miller v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 290 U. S. 227, 231, 54 S. Ct.
172, 78 L. ed. 285.

14
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The facts are as different as could be imagined
fro1n Pippy v. Oregon Short Lin~ R. Co., 79 Utah 425,
11 P.(2d) 305, \vhere, among other things, the defendant's train was proceeding at sixty miles per hour over
an obstructed crossing consisting of many tracks and a
badly rutted road, vvith plaintiff driving at fro1n five to
six miles per hour and testifying~ that the automatic signals did not \York a.nd that no whistle or bell was sounded.
This is the only Utah case permitting recovery, and
then by a three-two decision reversing the court below
because of the extreme facts against the railroad.
As Mr. Justice Holmes said for the unanimous court
in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66,
72 L. ed. 167 :
''If at the last moment Goodman (the driver)
found hlmself in an emergency it was his own
fault that he did not reduce his speed earlier
and come to a stop.''
(c) Here defendant had neither the last
a clear chance to avoid the accident.

chanc~e

nor

Certainly if Paddock and Hyland were to be believed, 10 to 15 feet was no time within which, ascertaining plaintiff's peril, defendant could act to avoid
the collision. Hyland, when he first saw the car, guessed
that he could have stopped the train (R. 310) but was
under no duty to do so in view of the train's right of
way. And when he realized the plaintiff's danger-since
for some reason Andersen had determined to end-run
the train-it was too late to even kick the angle-cock.
(R. 309)
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Paddock, too, saw the automobile seem to reduce
speed as if to stop; then when Andersen swerved to the
other lane and kept proceeding it was too late for the
train to stop, although he gave Engineer Colby the
washout or emergency signal. (R. 317) His final statement to Mr. Black was that it never occurred that there
might be a collision until the leading part .of the train
was 1'5 feet from the pavement. (R. 329) Then under
all guesses and opinions it was too late to stop, since
four to six car lengths was the most favorable guess to
plaintiff as to the minimum stopping distance; and
under Paddock's version the actual stop was normal.
(R. 320)
Nor did Colby testify to the contrary. He big-holed
momentarily before Paddock's washout; the day after
the accident he estimated the lead car to be but one car
length from the crossing. (R. 279) At the trial he left
that distance to Paddock, Hyland and Chipman on the
train's front end. (R. 280) Even with every brake in
emergency he could not have stopped the train before
the point of impact. (R. 293)
A.

No, I couldn't have stopped short of the
crossing, if they had all went in emergency.

Q·. What you told me, if the brakes stopped,
as you hoped they would, the plaintiff might
have had a better chance to get around the
front of the train, because you would have
slowed down a little more; is that it~
A.

Well, that is due to the fact that the emergency is much quicker than a service ; you
get your full brake power much quicker.
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Q.

Well, if you had all the emergency that you
eould have desired, isn't it a fact the train
wouldn ~t have stopp·ed by the crossing, but
it might have slowed down sufficiently so
the plaintiff might have completed running
around the front end of the train; isn't that
right~

.A..

There is a possibility, yes; I believe I made
that statement before.

Q.

And you didn't have a clear opportunity or
wouldn't have had a clear opportunity to
have stopped that train without it going
into the crossing; is that right~

A.

No, not under those procedures.

Q.

And that is necessarily so because you are
not sure exactly how far the front end was
from the crossing; isn't that right~

A.

No, I wasn't sure until they got around the
curve far enough that I could see the switchman's light and see the lights of the head
car shining down the highway.

Q.

You would rather leave the exact distance
as to how far that said train was from the
crossing to the men who were there~

A.

Yes, as to when I received the washout signal, you c.ould determine then as to how far
I was from it when I used emergency, hecause it was momentarily after I went to
the emergency position when I got the washout.

Chipman guessed most favorably for plaintiff, and
his testimony therefore must be used in testing the correctness of the court's ruling. In contrast to Paddock
and Hyland, he thought the washout signal and big-hole
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emergency brake application were given when the end
of the lead car was about three car lengths away. (R.
226) But he, too, Staid the dista;nce wa,s itnsufficient t.o
stop short .of the coll.ision (R. 226) :
Q.

About how far was the lead end of the car,
the leading car, from the intersection from
the highway itself, at the time when you
saw that washout signal given~

A.

Well, around about three cars; we was right
there by those poles, I am pretty sure, in
there.

Q.

You say three car lengths to the south and ·
east, or to the south of the crossing~

A.

Yes, up towards the mountain.

Q.

Now, was the train able to stop short of
the collision~

A.

No.

It was Colby-who had abrogated his own guesses
as to distance to Paddock, Chipman and Hyland (R,.
293-294) - who interjected the testimony supporting
plaintiff's theory in this case: "Plaintiff may have had
a better chance to get around the front of the train'' if
every brake had gone into emergency, as they were not
designed to do. (R. 293)
But Paddock, Chipman and Hyland unanimously
scotched that hope. While plaintiff argues on page
19 of his brief "a split second would have saved the
plaintiff harmless'', the three men who were the·re in
effect said "The time was too short, even by a hair".
As in the case of contributory negligence on the
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part of plaintiff drivers, the present Utah Supreme Court
by unanimous decision has but recently declared the
Utah lR\V on the last clear chance doctrine and specifically
where railroad crossing accidents are involved.
In the case of \:--an VVagoner v. Union P·acific R. Co.,
-------- Utah --------, 186 P. ( 2d) 293, decided November 3,
1947, the court quoted extensively from the R~statement
of the Law of Torts and from Graham v. Johnson, 166
P.(2d) 230, 235, 109 Utah 365, dealing with the Last
Clear Chance Doctrine as app1ied to automobile intersection cases. It concluded:
''The opportunity to avoid the accident must
not be a possibility; it must he a clear opportunity. Not even by speculation could the jury reach
a ve-rdict on the- theory that the train crew had
time to appreciate that deceased was negligent
and that by reasonable means they could have
avoided the resulting collision. Wh·en, as in this
jurisdiction, a train has the p·referred right of
way, its operator is entitled to assume the driver
of a car will yield to this preferment, and if the
doctrine of last clear chance is to be invoked, it
must clearly appear that time permitted the
train crew to appreciate the deceased's predicament, and to give warnings sufficiently early
enough for the deceased to extricate himself, or
the time element was sufficient to permit the
crw to bring the train to a stop·. No such showing was made here. ' '
In spite of allegations in the complaint that defendant's train crew failed to observe and give proper warnings, the undisputed evidence in this case shows in contrast that here defendant's train crew was keenly alert
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and mindful of the hazard of the crossing. Every step
possible was taken to warn the oncoming motor vehicle
by way of whistle, bell, swinging signal lanterns, keeping
the train under control at slow speed, all in addition
to the standard crossing warning signals maintained
by both the defendant and the State Road Commission.
With this testimony defendant submits that under
Utah law the doctrine of the last clear chance should not
have been applied to excuse plaintiff from his own negligence. The defendant had neither the last chance nor a
clear chance; and the remarks of Mr. Justice Wolfe in
his concurring opinion in the Van Wagoner case are
particularly apt:
''A driver who drives in front of an oncoming engine or train with insufficient time to
cross is hardly in position to say: 'If you had
made it smoother, I might or could have gotten
clear by a hair '. '?
The situation appears squarely governed by the
Van Wagoner case and the Graham case :
''Where the situation is, to reasonable minds,
so doubtful as to whether the second party had
time to avoid it, the matter should not be given
to the jury; otherwise, we are, as said in the case
of Thomas v. Sadleir, 108 Utah 552, 162 P. (2d)
112, 115, in grave danger of permitting the one
really at 'fault to shift the hlame for the accident
on the other by accentuation of the other's duty to
avoid the effect of the first one's negligence'."
'S:ee :also application of .the same rule to the facts in
the cases of St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Sum20
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mers, (C.C.A. 8) 1909, 173 F. 358; Illinois Central R. Co.
v. Nelson, (C.C.A. 8) 1909, 173 F. 915; Denver City
Tram,Yay Y. Cobb, (C.C.A. 8) 1908, 164 F. 41; and Atchison, Topeka & ·Santa Fe Ry. v. Taylor, ( C.C.A. 8)
1912, 196 F. 878.
This court has said in the

\~"an

Wagoner case :

~'When

one party thrusts upon another the
onus of avoiding an accident which was due entirely to the fact that the first party is in the
fairly rapid p-rocess of placing himself in the
path of a car driven by the second party, the
court, before it permits the jury to determine
whether the second ·party could have avoided the
accident, must he reasonably sure that there was
time enough for the jury to so find. * * * ''
The opinion then quotes the following from Section
480, Chapter 17, Volume II, Restatement of Torts:
''A plaintiff who, hy the exercise of reasonable vigilance could have observed the danger
created· by the defendant's negligence in time
to have avoided harm therefrom, may recover if,
but only if, the defendant (a) knew of the plaintiff's. situation, and (h) realized or had reason
to realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and
therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time
to avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
competence his then existing ability to avoid
harming the plaintiff." (Italics ours.)
The Meredith case, supra, clearly says that the
Federal Safety Ap·pliance Act does not create such ab-solute liability as to preclude application of this prin-
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ciple of Utah law, and the decision of the Tenth Circuit
further. emphasized this same point in this case. (109
Fed 2d 328)
IV.

Counsel for plaintiff in this case were of counsel in
the Drummond case; consequently here reliance was
placed on the essential combination of the Federal Saf·ety
Appliance Act and the Last Clear Chance Doctrine to
avoid the consequences of the Drummond case.
But when the undisputed and admitted facts were
boiled down in the record before this court, we find:
1. Plaintiff failed to listen, look or stop, and under
the doctrine of the Drunnnond case, continued negligently driving his automobile into the crossing.
2. Likewise defendant's negligence-if under the
Federal Act indeed negligence it was-continued parallel
with that of plaintiff until the tim·e of impact.
3. There was ia bare p~ossibility only that with braking equipment of 'll!'nquestioned condition, the accident
might have been avoided. The court could not therefore
''be reasonably sure that there was ~time enough for the
jury" to hold that the railroad could have avoided the
accident.
We have already adverted to the fact that the plaintiff has no explanation for his own course of conduct.
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To paraphrase Mr. J~stice Wolfe, plaintiff here says:
"If you had only stopped a little bit sooner, I might or
could have gotten clear by a hair." But this Court has
said that to grant relief on this basis would be to permit
''the one really at 'fault to shift the blame for the accident'." This the Utah law prohibits; and Congress has
not abrogated Utah's rule.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the court below should be sus~tained. The jury was fairly
and properly instructed and deternrined the issues contrary to plaintiff. This, though the same result should
have been reached by granting defendant's motion for
directed verdict.

Respectfully submitted,

C. C. P ARS·ONS,
WM. M. McCREA,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for RespofYI)de'(YI)~

Bingham amd Garfield Railway C omparrvy.
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